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Since 1951 the editors of the Harvard Law Review have se-
lected a prominent scholar of constitutional law to write a "Fore-
word" to the Review's annual survey of the work of the Supreme 
Court. Within the community of scholars of constitutional law 
the "Forewords" are widely taken to be good indications of the 
state of the field. The Foreword project defines a vision of the 
field of constitutional scholarship. After describing the history 
and current reputation of the Forewords, this Essay examines 
some of the structural constraints on the project. It concludes 
with an analysis of some dimensions of the intellectual project 
the Forewords have defined. In addition to proposing a modest 
revision of the accepted understanding of the intellectual history 
of constitutional law scholarship, we hope that, by suggesting a 
less-than-obvious connection between constitutional scholarship 
and constitutional law, the analysis can give us insight into the 
directions constitutional law scholarship may take in the next 
decade. 
I. HISTORY AND IMPACT 
The Harvard Law Review began to publish student-written 
Notes surveying the prior Supreme Court Term in 1949. Two 
years later the first Foreword appeared.! Since 1985, the Re-
view's Supreme Court edition has included a legal scholar's case 
comment on one major decision of the previous term.z 
The Forewords continue a tradition at the Review examining 
the work of the Court on a term-by-term basis.3 The tradition 
began with a series of articles on the Court written by then 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
•• J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1. The Supreme Court, 1948 Term, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 119 (1949). 
2. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Comment, Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Authority: 
The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1985). 
3. See With the Editors, 74 Harv. L. Rev. vii (1960). 
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Harvard Law Professor Felix Frankfurter,4 who was joined by 
James M. Landis and Adrian S. Fisher, and by Henry M. Hart, 
Jr., who was to have his own Foreword in 1959.s At first these 
articles considered only one Supreme Court term, but in 1937 
they began to consider two terms in one article.6 Frankfurter's 
participation ended in 1938, a year before he was appointed to 
the Supreme Court. The series ended shortly after Frankfurter 
left.7 The articles begun by Frankfurter are similar to the succes-
sor Forewords in that both rely predominantly on legal scholars, 
not students. 
Over time, the Forewords have gained a considerable pres-
tige and influence. For example, to support the proposition that 
"[o)ur age is obsessed with equal protection," James Liebman 
notes that "11 of the last 26 Forewords ... have been principally 
concerned with equal protection."s The so-called "Republican 
4. Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of 
the United States-A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 1005 (1925); 
Felix Frankfurter, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States-A Study in the 
Federal J11dicial System, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 325 (1925); Felix Frankfurter and James M. 
Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States-A Study in the Federal 
Judicial System, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1110 (1927); Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The 
Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1928); Felix Frank-
furter and James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1928,43 
Harv. L. Rev. 33 (1929); Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business of the 
Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1930); Felix Frankfurter and 
James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1930, 45 Harv. L. 
Rev. 271 (1931); Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme 
Court at October Term, 1931,46 Harv. L. Rev. 226 (1932); Felix Frankfurter and Henry M. 
Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1932, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 245 
(1933); Felix Frankfurter and Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at 
October Term, 1933, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 238 (1934); Felix Frankfurter and Henry M. Hart, 
Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 68 (1935); 
Felix Frankfurter and Adrian S. FISher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October 
Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 577 (1938); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of 
the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1937 and 1938, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 579 (1940). 
5. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, Foreword: The Tune Chart 
of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1959). 
6. These earlier articles, "while not considering the substance of the Court's deci-
sions . . . scrutinized developments in the Court's jurisdiction and procedure and, in the 
broadest sense, its role in the American federal system." With the Editors, 74 Harv. L. 
Rev. at vii (cited in note 3). 
7. Presumably, Frankfurter's departure contributed in part to the lapse of nine 
years before the Review began publishing its annual student written note and reinstituted 
its term-by-term analysis. 
8. James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All -Out" School Desegregation Ex-
plained, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1463, 1541 and n. 360 (1990). See also Paul F. Campos, Advo-
cacy and Scholarship, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 817, 819 (1993) (referring to the issue of the 
Harvard Law Review in which the "Foreword" appears as "the annual piece de resistance 
of American legal scholarship," although Campos discusses one of the case comments in 
the issue rather than a Foreword). 
1994-95] HARVARD FOREWORDS 465 
Revival" was validated by Frank Michelman's Foreword of 1986.9 
This growing prominence is reflected in stylistic changes within 
the Forewords themselves, frequent citations to previous Fore-
words by subsequent Foreword authors and other scholars, and 
generalizations about the Forewords or their authors. 
1\vo stylistic changes mark the transformation to promi-
nence. First, through 1955 the Foreword author's name appeared 
at the end of the article, although lead articles placed the au-
thor's name at the front. In 1956 the name of the Foreword's 
author appeared at the front. The shift in 1956 acknowledges 
that the Forewords had become the intellectual equivalent of the 
lead articles.to 
A second stylistic shift seen in the Forewords is their increas-
ing length.ll Although this increase in size was part of a general 
increase in the size of law review articles,12 it does suggest that 
the Forewords were becoming more important. The change in 
length between the first and second decade of Forewords brought 
about a greater than proportional increase in quality. Among 
the first ten Forewords, several are brief, inconsequential essays 
likely dashed off rather quickly; unlike later Forewords, they do 
not attempt any systematic or extensive approach to the preced-
ing Court term. Indeed, the Forewords' increasing length is one 
function of the authors' efforts. As the Forewords became more 
highly regarded, scholars might have been inclined to write more; 
they may have felt that they had to measure up to the standards 
set by their predecessors.IJ 
9. For a table listing the Forewords and other information relied on in this essay, 
see Appendix B. 
10. Conclusions about stylistic changes can be only tentative at best; such changes 
may have wholly insignificant causes. 
11. Of the first ten Forewords, five were less than ten pages long; eight were less 
than 15 pages; nine were less than 20 pages. The longest Foreword of this period, Hart's, 
was 41 pages; the shortest, Howe's, was five pages. In contrast, the shortest Foreword of 
the second group of ten was 17 pages; the longest was 53 pages. In the third decade of 
Forewords, the shortest was 22 pages and the longest was 73 pages. In the fourth decade 
of Forewords, the shortest was 57 pages and the longest was 101 pages. The first two 
Forewords of the fifth decade have been 72 and 102 pages long. 
12. See Roger C. Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Institution": The American Law 
Review, 36 J. Legal Ed. 1, 6 n.24 (1986) (statistical sampling of three prestigious law re-
views found major articles' average length increased from 25 to over 40 pages over time). 
13. A similar phenomenon may be seen in the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectureship 
at Harvard. See J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bicke~ the Scholarly Tradition, and the 
Supreme Coun, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 769, 769 n.2 (1971): "It is Professor Bickel himself who 
refers to the offer of the Holmes Lectureship as a 'call'- not inappropriately, since many 
of the past Holmes Lectures have attained an almost religious authority in the legal com-
munity." The increasing size of the Forewords is also due in part to the change from legal 
process critiques to substantive critiques: the latter generally involve the description of a 
model by which to judge the Court's work and then an application of the model to the 
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The significance of the Review's project can also be seen 
through citations to Forewords, including the degree to which 
Foreword writers cite previous Forewords. Such citations may 
reflect an author's belief that the previous Forewords were signif-
icant enough to be considered as authority, and, we suggest, in-
creasingly significant as authorities. They also identify the 
Forewords as an intellectual project. 
The first citation to a Foreword in a subsequent Foreword 
occurred in 1955.14 Thereafter, Foreword writers have often 
cited the work that preceded theirs. Indeed, the authors begin to 
treat the Forewords as an institution unto itself. Griswold's 1959 
Foreword uses Hart's Foreword and Judge Arnold's reply as a 
springboard. In 1964, Kurland's Foreword's first sentence refers 
to "[t]hese annual chronicles of the work of the Supreme Court 
of the United States, of which this is the sixteenth."ts Kalven's 
1972 Foreword refers to "this annual task."t6 By 1973, Tribe 
takes up Gunther's 1972 Foreword with the phrase, "(l]ast year in 
these pages."11 By referring to "the task of Foreword-writing," 
Tribe is also the first such author to describe Forewords as a 
unique genre.ts Finally, Karst recognizes Forewords as an insti-
tution with his comment about ideas offered "in these pages."19 
Notably, the first Forewords did not treat them as a distinctive 
form of scholarship with a project of their own. 
Another aspect of the Forewords' growing importance may 
be seen in the degree to which Forewords are cited by other 
scholars. Such citations reveal some Forewords to be among the 
"classics of legal scholarship."zo One study found that among the 
fifty most-cited law review articles, five were Forewords; the 
most-cited law review article in the entire study was Gunther's 
1972 Foreword.21 
various decisions-all of which require a significant number of pages. See text accompa-
nying note 90 infra. 
14. Robert Braucher, The Supreme Court, 1954 Term, Foreword, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 
120, 123 n.9 (1955). Hereafter Forewords are cited by author's name only. Full citations 
are in Appendix A. 
15. Kurland at 143. 
16. Kalven at 4. 
17. Tribe at 1. 
18. Id. at 14. 
19. Karst at 40. 
20. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1540, 1540 
(1985). 
21. Id. at 1549-51. Gunther's Foreword was the most cited law review article, being 
cited 600 times; Cox's first Foreword, in 1966, was the seventh most frequently cited arti-
cle with 250 citations; Michelman's 1969 Foreword, his first, was cited 230 times and was 
thd tenth most cited article; Black's 1967 Foreword was the twelfth most cited article, with 
225 citations; Hart's Foreword was cited 156 times and was the thirtieth most cited article; 
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The Forewords' prestige is also reflected in generalizations 
made about its authors and about the Forewords themselves. 
John Hart Ely writes that whoever writes the most recent Fore-
word is the " 'hottest' constitutional theorist in the country" at 
the time,22 and though Ely's specific references were designed to 
express his respect for scholars he was then criticizing, his com-
ment plainly reflects the profession's general view. In 1971, 
Judge Skelly Wright felt that the legal process Forewords of the 
1950s and 1960s were such a strong influence and force to be 
reckoned with that he placed them within "the scholarly tradi-
tion" -a unique "mode of scholarly criticism" -and felt the 
need to criticize the view of the Supreme Court's limited role 
they espoused.23 A 1985 study of the most-cited law review arti-
cles noted that 
[o]ne area of omission in Shepard's Law Review Citations 
which it was necessary to rectify involved the annual Fore-
words to the Supreme Court issue of the Harvard Law Review. 
Although this is a prestigious series which often presents im-
portant scholarship, Shepard's lumps it together with notes, 
comments, book reviews and the like .... 24 
The decision of the study's author to make methodological adap-
tations to include the Forewords, and the laudatory comments he 
addressed to this series, are strong indicators of their 
significance. 
and Monaghan's Foreword was cited 140 times and was the forty-third most cited article. 
Because of the methodological idiosyncracies of this study-the data base includes only 
Forewords published after the mid-1960s, with one exception (Hart's 1959 Foreword)-it 
is quite likely that other Forewords not in the database, especially Bickel's 1960 Fore-
word, should properly be considered as belonging on any such list. (Robert C. Berring 
includes Bickel's 1960 Foreword on his list of the greatest American law review articles. 
Id. at 1545-46 n.33 (citing Robert C. Berring, ed., Great American Law Reviews (Legal 
Classics Library, 1984)).) 
22. John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a 
World Where Courts Are No Different From Legislatures, 77 Va. L. Rev. 833, 842 n. 18 
(1991) ("Lest you suppose I have chosen some obscure eccentric to make my point, 
[Chemerinsky is] presumptively the ... 'hottest' constitutional theorist"). Ely of course 
exaggerates this phenomenon. First, "hot" connotes recognition of early talent, not a 
laurel at the end of one's career. Yet, when they wrote their second Forewords, neither 
Cox nor Freund could be considered a hot scholar. And, conversely, Tigar, who wrote his 
1970 Foreword just three years out of law school, could hardly have been considered a hot 
constitutional law theorist that early in his career. Further, some scholars who have not 
written Forewords surely ought to be considered among the hottest theorists. Although 
identifying such scholars may be difficult, see note 29 infra, we believe that Catharine 
MacKinnon and Cass Sunstein, for example, would be among the hottest constitutional 
theorists of the present generation (unless people who make substantial contributions 
over an extended period cannot be described as ever being "hot"). 
23. Wright, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 770 (cited in note 13). 
24. Shapiro, 73 Cal. L. Rev. at 1546 (cited in note 20). 
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II. STRUCfURE 
Next we identify some structural features of the Forewords 
which, we argue, have some bearing on the nature of the ques-
tions addressed and answers offered by the Forewords. 
Although, as that formulation suggests, there can be no sharp 
division between structure and substance, our primary interest 
lies in identifying the intellectual project of the Forewords taken 
as a group. The structural features we identify provide some con-
straints on the intellectual project itself. 
1. Elite status: Not surprisingly, most of the authors of the 
Forewords have been associated with the nation's elite law 
schools.zs The first Foreword written by someone not closely as-
sociated with Harvard itself was either Bickel's of 1961 or Pol-
lak's of 1963.26 Tigar, writing the 1970 Foreword, was the first 
author not teaching at one of the elite law schools,27 and of the 
forty-three authors only seven were not teaching at elite law 
schools when they wrote the Forewords.zs 
There are a number of reasons for the concentration of au-
thors at elite law schools.z9 First, there is the usual "home court 
advantage": those who teach at an institution generally have fa-
vored access to "their" school's law review. Twenty-one of the 
Forewords have been written by scholars teaching at Harvard.30 
25. We follow the conventional designation of Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Stan-
ford (in the modem era), and Yale as the elite law schools. 
26. The classification is inexact because, although Bickel taught at Yale, he was 
closely associated with the "Harvard" school of scholarship associated with his mentor 
Felix Frankfurter. Pollak was the first author who did not teach at Harvard and did not 
have a law degree from Harvard. 
27. When Tigar wrote the Foreword be was an untenured professor at the law 
school of the University of California-Los Angeles. After practicing law for some years, 
he returned to teaching at the University of Texas. 
28. Mishkin (Pennsylvania), Tigar, Monaghan (Boston University), Karst (UCLA), 
Sager (New York University), Chemerinsky (University of Southern California), and 
West (University of Maryland). (When Bell's Foreword was published in 1985, he had 
completed his service as Dean at the University of Oregon Law School and was in the 
process of returning to Harvard, where be bad been a professor from 1971 to 1980. We 
think it appropriate to count Bell as a Harvard professor in our analysis.) 
29. We note one difficulty in relying solely on the published Forewords as the basis 
for some of the analysis. There may well be scholars who declined invitations to write 
Forewords, and they might be different in revealing ways from the scholars who did write. 
We considered developing a list of scholars who "ought" to have written Forewords but 
did not, and writing them to find out whether they bad declined an invitation. In the end, 
we decided not to pursue that course. Coming up with an appropriate list would be quite 
difficult, and drafting a letter that would not touch on some obvious sensitivities that the 
recipients (and nonrecipients) might have would be even more so. 
30. 1\vo points of qualification are necessary here. We have included Robert Mc-
Closkey as a Harvard teacher, though be was in the Government Department and not the 
Law School. In addition, there is something of a "start up" effect. For the first decade 
Harvard teachers wrote all but one of the Forewords (the exception is Fairman). That 
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Second, and not unrelated, there is the "Matthew effect":Jt those 
invited to write Forewords must be known to the editors of the 
Harvard Law Review; they will inevitably be differentially aware 
of scholars at Harvard who could be considered as potential au-
thors of Forewords, and the nature of elite education suggests 
that they will be differentially aware of similar scholars at other 
elite schools. 
These explanations describe a causal arrow running from the 
elite school to selection by the editors: "Because these people 
teach at elite schools, they are candidates for authorship of a 
Foreword." Perhaps, though, the causal arrow runs the other 
way: "If a person has an interesting mind, he or she will be more 
likely to teach at an elite school, and will-independently of the 
'school' effect-be more likely to be invited to write a Fore-
word." Some such mechanism might well be at work to some 
extent. Elite schools have reached that status in part because 
they attract and select faculty members who have interesting 
minds at a somewhat higher rate than non-elite schools, and then 
provide them with an environment of intellectual and material 
resources that allows that effect to be amplified. Still, we note 
two qualifications. First, the rate of elite authorship seems some-
what high even taking this causal mechanism into account.32 Sec-
ond, if the causal mechanism is that having an interesting mind 
leads one both to be invited to write a Foreword and to be on the 
faculty of an elite law school, we might expect that authors who 
taught at non-elite schools when they wrote the Forewords would 
eventually join the faculties of elite schools. Yet, of the seven 
authors from non-elite schools, only one (Monaghan) has as yet 
moved to an elite school after writing the Foreword.33 
may be because the prestige of the Foreword was not fully established for several years, 
and because there may have been a backlog of Harvard professors who, for local political 
reasons, "had" to be asked to write a Foreword before any outsider was invited. 1\velve 
of the last thirty-two Forewords have been written by Harvard professors, which seems 
still high enough to warrant invoking the "home court advantage" as a possible 
explanation. 
31. See Matthew 13:12 ("For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall 
have more abundance"). 
32. Confirming this judgment would require an enumeration of scholars who have 
made important contributions to the field but who have not yet written a Foreword. We 
refrain from such an enumeration, not only for the reason alluded to supra note 29, but 
also because the list we would produce would be no less subjective than the more general 
evaluation we offer in the text. 
33. Of course, the number of such authors is so small that the fact that they have not 
been as mobile as this causal model suggests might be entirely accounted for by idiosyn-
cratic factors. 
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2. Publication schedule: Producing the Foreword places 
some constraints on who can be invited to write one. Nominally, 
at least, the Foreword is supposed to make interesting comments 
on decisions by the Supreme Court in the term that ends in June 
or July. Many of the Court's most interesting decisions are 
handed down near the end of the term, and the Foreword must 
appear in early November. This places severe time constraints 
on the author of the Foreword. From the perspective of the edi-
tors selecting an author in the late winter, perhaps the most im-
portant consideration is that the author must tum the Foreword 
in on time. Here too the Matthew effect operates, in two ways. 
One of the best predictors of timeliness is that the potential au-
thor has a record of productivity. An alternative is that the edi-
tors know that the potential author has in hand, or is well along 
in the process of developing, an analytic framework into which 
whatever the Court does in June or July can be inserted. This, 
however, leads to another structural point about the Forewords. 
3. Disappointment: In the physical sciences people receive 
Nobel Prizes for having one really good idea.34 Legal scholarship 
is not that different. People become prominent because early in 
their careers they articulate a distinctive and important idea. The 
remainder of their careers are, ordinarily, devoted to living off 
that idea-applying it to new areas, coming up with minor vari-
ants, responding to criticisms, and the like.3s The constraints of 
the selection process and of time mean that Forewords are sys-
tematically likely to be disappointing, in the sense that they are 
likely to be less interesting than the most interesting work their 
authors have previously written. The people who are chosen to 
write them will already have had, and will already have distrib-
uted widely, the one really good idea of their careers. The Fore-
word is likely to be a replay of that idea in the context of the 
Supreme Court's most recent cases.36 It is thus likely to seem 
34. Part of what makes Albert Einstein so celebrated is that he had three really 
good ideas and received the Nobel Prize for the least important of them. 
35. This is roughly the equivalent in scholarship to the more general phenomenon of 
regression to the mean: After a particularly good (or bad) performance of some task, the 
actor is likely to regress to the mean of his or her performance in general, and perform 
worse (or better) than the initial performance. 
36. Alternatively, the author might disregard the Supreme Court's decisions 
(Sager's Foreword, for example, has nothing to do with the Supreme Court's decisions in 
the immediately preceding term), or tack something about the Supreme Court's work on 
to an analysis that has little to do with that work. For a comment on this phenomenon, 
see Mark Thshnet, Red, White and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 167-68 
(Harv. U. Press, 1988). These strategies run the risk that the author's Foreword will sim-
ply and obviously be a mere vehicle for replaying the author's only good idea-or, even 
worse, a new but not-as-good idea. 
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like a set piece of the sort performing artists have in their reper-
toires. Audiences can find set pieces interesting, though their cri-
teria for evaluation tend to involve how well the performer 
executed a familiar piece rather than how new and striking the 
performance was. 
The tendency toward disappointing performance can be 
overcome. Of course, the author might simply do an unusually 
good job of what led him or her to be selected in the first place, 
though the time constraints make this unlikely. Or, the editors 
might, almost by chance, catch an author just at the point when 
he or she is having the second really good idea of his or her 
career.37 
4. Criticism: Forewords are structurally inclined to be criti-
cal of the Court's performance. It is much easier to say why the 
Court got some points wrong than to say that, all things consid-
ered, the Court actually did a pretty good job last yeaos An 
author could write a defense of the Court's work by enumerating 
criticisms that have been made of that work and then showing 
why those criticisms were erroneous. Yet, the fact that the Fore-
word deals with the Court's most recent term means that there 
will have been relatively little informed criticism of the decisions 
of that term. To write a defense against criticism, the author 
would have to invent the criticisms and then refute them. This, 
though not impossible, is quite awkward.39 
5. Age structure: Eleven authors were teaching for less 
than ten years when they wrote, and ten were teaching for more 
than twenty. Forewords are thus typically produced by people 
who have been teaching for ten to twenty years, and who, there-
fore, received their legal training about fifteen to twenty-five 
years earlier. Many educators believe that intellectual "forma-
tions" are relatively firmly set in the earliest years of education,40 
and that appears to be true of approaches people have to ques-
tions of legal analysis. In general, then, there is likely to be a 
substantial lag of about a generation between the issues that oc-
37. Cover's Foreword may be a dramatic, and isolated, example. 
38. To say that Forewords are structurally critical, however, is not to say what the 
grounds of criticism are. We argue below that the grounds have changed in interesting 
ways, from criticism of the Court for failing to behave as a constitutional court should to 
criticism of the Court for coming out the wrong way. 
39. For a recent defense of a Supreme Court decision that has been widely criticized, 
which took the author two years to get into a form he found minimally acceptable, see 
Mark Thshnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 117. 
40. See, e.g., Jerome S. Bruner, A Study of Thinking (Wiley, 1956); Jerome S. 
Bruner, et. al, Studies in Cognitive Growth (Wiley, 1966). 
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cupy the Supreme Court's attention and those that engage the 
authors of Forewords.4t 
6. Positivism and lag: The lag can be offset by several fac-
tors. First, the Foreword is supposed to be concerned with the 
Supreme Court's recent work. That work, though, is itself sub-
ject to a number of pressures related to questions of "lag." If 
scholars in their second decade are in some sense one generation 
behind, the Justices of the Supreme Court may be two or more 
generations behind, and, depending on the rate of turnover on 
the Court, may fall increasingly behind.42 At the same time, 
however, the Justices necessarily face contemporary social issues; 
though they have some control over their docket, it would be 
extraordinary if some substantive issue of contemporary impor-
tance stayed away from the Court for an extended period.43 
They could, of course, approach these contemporary questions 
with a mind-set determined a generation or two earlier. Yet, the 
41. Before turning to the consequences of lag, we note a number of apparently spe-
cial cases, most of which fall in the category of "firsts." If the modal author of a Foreword 
is a teacher at an elite law school in the profession for over a decade, who are the "devi-
ants"? (a) Time: Eleven authors have written before completing ten years of teaching. 
Two occurred in the early years of the Forewords, and probably should be set aside 
(Howe, Sacks). The others are Bickel, Pollak, Michelman, ligar, Tribe, Brest, Minow, 
Chemerinsky, West, and Sullivan. It cannot be an accident that ligar was selected at the 
outset of his teaching career, at the height of the protests against the Vietnam War, and 
just after he had been denied a clerkship with William Brennan because of Justice Bren-
nan's concern about the political implications for him and the Court of choosing a promi-
nently radical law clerk. For a discussion of the controversy, see Nat Hentoff, Profiles: 
The Constitutionalist, New Yorker, Mar. 12, 1990, at 45-70. Minow was the first woman 
chosen to write a Foreword; the two other women also have written Forewords relatively 
early in their academic careers. (Because the issue comes up in conversations about the 
Forewords, we note that Bell, the first and as yet only African-American chosen to write a 
Foreword, fits within the modal category of authors at elite schools in the second decade 
of their teaching careers. We have no information on whether the editors of the Law 
Review thought of Bell as a special case; we would not.) (b) Dual authors: Three schol-
ars have written two Forewords (Freund, Cox, and Michelman). In 1974 Freund was the 
country's most respected scholar of constitutional law, and wrote a foreword devoted to 
Watergate and United States v. Nixon; we take the choice to have been a political state-
ment by the editors. Like Freund, Cox wrote his second Foreword after 35 years in teach-
ing, the latest point of any author; we take his selection to be recognition of his stature 
near his retirement. (c) Conservatives: Of the Forewords' authors in recent years, only 
Easterbrook and Epstein are prominent conservatives. The paucity of conservative au-
thors may be an indication of the operation of the lag we have identified, and may change 
in the future. 
42. Justices have sometimes explained that they find it useful to have recent law 
graduates serve as law clerks for only one or two years so that the Justices can keep in 
touch with developments in the law schools. 
43. This assertion must be qualified by the important observation that justiciability 
doctrines may systematically keep some issues out of court. Notably, that was true of the 
central developments of the national security state in the Cold War era. For a general 
discussion, see Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution (Yale U. Press, 
1990), especially 146-48. 
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Justices also are political actors, in the sense that they seek con-
temporary political influence on and approval from constituen-
cies they find important.44 If they use their older ways of 
thinking to deal with contemporary issues, the Justices are less 
likely to have contemporary political influence. How these pres-
sures work out in practice may vary, but it seems a fair descrip-
tion of a great deal of the Supreme Court's history, and 
particularly of the past half-century, that the Court is best under-
stood as responding to contemporary issues in contemporary 
terms.4s 
Scholars face a different set of pressures. The mere fact that 
the Foreword deals with the Supreme Court provides some force 
against the effects of lag. 46 Scholars formed a generation earlier 
can, of course, apply the mind-set developed during that genera-
tion to the Court's work, and indeed, as we argue below, that is 
the characteristic form of the Foreword. But, as the formative 
generation recedes, applying its criteria is likely to seem increas-
ingly old-fashioned, and may contribute to the systematic disap-
pointment mentioned above. 
Second, to the extent that the Foreword is designed to illu-
minate questions of interest to people engaged in the practice of 
constitutional law, it must deal with contemporary issues in rela-
tively contemporary terms. Third, and related to this, is what Fe-
lix Cohen called "the normative power of the actual. "47 For 
present purposes, that is a variant of Chief Justice Hughes's 
statement that the Constitution is what the judges say it is. What 
the Supreme Court does is what scholarship about constitutional 
law must address. 
In selecting authors of Forewords, then, the editors of the 
Law Review are likely to be sensitive to the positivist impulses of 
law and therefore of legal scholarship, and may to some degree 
try, perhaps unconsciously, to offset the effects of the lag. Of 
course, because the editors are themselves being taught by peo-
ple whose formation typically occurred a generation earlier, it is 
unrealistic to expect that the lag will be substantially countered 
by the editors' latent positivism. 
44. For an elaborate discussion framed in general terms, see Martin Shapiro, Courts: 
A Comparative and Political Analysis (U. of Chi. Press, 1981). 
45. The largest exception to the historical generalization is the Court in the mid-
1930s. Depending on how long the time-span one wants to impose, however, that might 
be treated as an aberration or as an example of a relatively brief period-from 1933 to 
1937-when the Court got out of line. 
46. Although, as we point out, see text accompanying note 98 infra, recent Fore-
words have tended not to deal with the major cases of the Supreme Court Term. 
47. Cited in Mishkin at 71. 
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Ill. INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
We turn finally to the most interesting aspects of the Fore-
words, the intellectual agendas they pursue. Taken as a whole, 
the Foreword project has its own story.48 The legal process fifties 
and sixties Forewords are displaced by the predominantly sub-
stantive Forewords written thereafter. An abbreviated intellec-
tual history of the Forewords might argue that legal process 
theory dominated until1963; that the first cracks in legal process 
hegemony appeared in Kurland's 1964 Foreword; that Black's 
1967 Foreword took a substantially different direction away from 
the legal process work that preceded him; that legal process ves-
tiges remained in the Forewords, notably in Henkin's (1968), 
Gunther's (1972), Monaghan's (1975), and in Cox's second Fore-
word (1980); that Michelman's 1969 Foreword set the new stan-
dard for Forewords, offering a substantive model by which to 
judge the Court's work; that this substantive model approach has 
continued; and that several post-Michelman Forewords have re-
turned to process type questions, albeit without that theory's 
heavy-handed criticism or motivating force. We look first at the 
characteristic features of the legal process Forewords, offer a crit-
icism of standard descriptions of that jurisprudential approach, 
and then explore the nature of the substantive Forewords of the 
1970s and 1980s. 
A. THE LEGAL PROCESS FOREWORDS 
The legal process movement has been described in great de-
tail by many other scholars.49 Legal process theory followed one 
line of descent from American legal realism. The legal realists 
attacked the formalism they believed characterized American 
legal thought, along two lines. The first was a skeptical challenge 
to claims that legal doctrines, rules, standards, and principles 
were sufficiently precise and systematic to satisfy the demand 
that we live under a government of law and not of men and wo-
men. The second was the suggestion that formalistic legal doc-
trine should be replaced by functional analyses, sensitive to the 
realities of how complex institutions-in the private and public 
48. But see Martin Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court, The Commentators, and 
the Search for Values, in Vincent Blasi, ed., The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution 
That Wasn't 218 (Yale U. Press, 1983) ("It is undoubtedly wrong to confuse what the 
Supreme Court does with what the commentators say about what it does"). Shapiro 
nonetheless accepts the view that different generations on the court are influenced by 
different generations of scholars, and vice versa. See id. at 727. 
49. See, e.g., Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 561 
(1988). 
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sectors-operated. This second attack on formalism drew on the 
increasingly prestigious social sciences like sociology and eco-
nomics, and sought to replace formalism with policy science. Ac-
cording to the prevailing view, legal process theory descended 
from the policy science branch of legal realism. By attending to 
the differences careful empirical studies revealed about law-mak-
ing institutions, legal process theory could domesticate the more 
skeptical claims of legal realism by insisting that, when decisions 
were properly allocated to their most suitable institutions, the 
grounds for skepticism would disappear. 
The Forewords of the 1950s and 1960s are, in addition to 
Weschler's "Neutral Principles" lecture, canonical legal process 
jurisprudence. The chief contribution of legal process to consti-
tutional theory was an account of judicial review in a democratic 
society. Under this view, Supreme Court justices must be cir-
cumspect when considering the constitutionality of legislation be-
cause they, unlike members of Congress, are unelected and only 
indirectly accountable to a democratic majority. Legal process 
theory attempted to reconcile law-making in the modem admin-
istrative state with democratic self-governance. Because law-
making was distributed among legislatures, administrative agen-
cies, and courts, legal process theory found its reconciliation in 
role definitions. These definitions were tied to the expertise and 
mechanics of the different institutions: administrative agencies 
could become familiar with the details of the industries they reg-
ulated, while courts brought a generalized concern for fair proce-
dures to questions of administrative law-making, for example. 
Administrative agencies, like legislatures, could examine the 
overall impact of alternative policies, while courts, confined to 
the adjudication of cases, would better understand how those 
policies worked in particular instances. Yet, these role defini-
tions always were placed against a backdrop where majorities 
could assert control, however unwisely, through legislation. By 
defining democracy as simple majority rule, though, legal process 
theory made constitutional review problematic. This fear, nur-
tured by the repudiation of Lochner, led to theories that limited 
judicial review. 
The Forewords of this period reflect the main tenets of legal 
process theory. Bickel's Foreword expressed an explicit fear of 
judicial review.so The legal process theory of institutional com-
petence makes numerous appearances in the legal process Fore-
50. Bickel at 47 ("judicial review is at least potentially a deviant institution in a 
democratic society"). 
476 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:463 
words.s1 The judicial function, legal process theorists believed, 
was uniquely suited for reasoned elaboration of principles. The 
focus on reasoned elaboration was often paired with an examina-
tion of the technical ability or craftsmanship of the Court's opin-
ions. According to legal process scholars, when in the course of 
reviewing a statute's constitutionality a judicial body did not ad-
here to its given institutional role, or its work product did not 
meet standards of craftsmanship or principled adjudication, that 
court was in jeopardy of acting without legitimacy or moral au-
thority. These notions appear recurrently in the legal process 
Forewords.s2 This did not mean an entirely mechanistic ap-
51. Jaffe at 114; Freund at 89; Braucher at 126; Hart at 110; Griswold at 93; Bickel at 
50, 75; McCloskey at 67, 70; Kurland at 144-45, 175; Mishkin at 65; Henkin at 83, 92; 
Kalven at 3; Gunther at 14; Tribe at 15; Monaghan at 19, 23, 28, 28-29; Brest at 54. 
52. Jaffe at 111 (concerned with Court's "professional performance"); Freund at 90 
(decision based on undeveloped facts), 91 (Court should have used a conditional decree); 
Sacks at 97, 98, 99 (good explanation for the reasons for the decision), 100 (summary 
opinions mean the reasons are not set out fully); Braucher at 121, 125 (reasons for deci-
sion were not fully persuasive); Brown at 80 (inadequate record on which to base judg-
ment); Hart at 96 ("what matters about Supreme Court opinions is not their quantity but 
their quality"), 121 ("Court ... should measure up to certain minimum standards of 
craftsmanship and intellectual responsibility"), 101 (inadequately reasoned opinions); 
Kurland at 144-45 (absence of workmanlike product; the absence of the right quality), 
145, 169 ("not unreasonable to hope for workmanlike quality"), 169 (failure to provide 
guidance for later litigation); Mishkin at 60-61 (reasoned elaboration); Cox at 95, 98; 
Henkin at 64, 65, 90, 92 (court shows "impatience with the processes, the difficulties, the 
constraints of principled decision"); Gunther at 4 (quality of opinions, their lucidity), 5 
(demands of judicial craftsmanship), 19 (cases provide doubt that new equal protection 
analysis rests on a carefully considered, fully elaborated rationale), 20 ("Is a reasoned 
articulation of this new mood possible?"), 20 (Court "can achieve a craftsmanlike con-
junction of continuity and change"); Monaghan at 27 (departure from the norm of princi-
pled adjudication); Cox at 9, 10, 24, 26, 27, 31, 73; Freund, at 96 (need to "strengthen the 
moral authority of the Court"); Sacks at 97 ("impart as much moral force ... as possi-
ble"), 98 (created the impression of moving "slowly and deliberately"); Braucher at 120 
(no praise for "judicial statesmanship"), 123 (concerned with public acceptance of deseg-
regation orders and wants to conserve the moral force of the Court's decisions); Brown at 
77 (respect for and authority of Court depends on whether its procedures are thought 
open and fair; summary judgments give a bad appearance), 82 (Court pays "a dispropor-
tionate price in public regard when it defeats counsel's reasonable expectation of a hear-
ing"); Hart at 101 ("threatens to undermine the professional respect of first-rate lawyers 
for the incumbent Justices of the Court, and this at the very time when the Court as an 
institution and the Justices who sit on it are especially in need of the bar's confidence and 
support"), 125 (prestige of the Court); Bickel at 48 (Court's prestige can generate con-
sent); McCloskey at 67 (Court's authority depends on the public's confidence in its moral 
sanction); Pollak at 63 (Court should husband the judicial authority already taxed heav-
ily, scarce ammunition); Kurland at 158 (Court's methods of avoiding the question "have 
demonstrated an imagination that certainly taxes the credulity of the average student of 
the Court's work"); Mishkin at 67 (concern about public support for the Court); Cox at 94 
(Court's enactments on civil rights "may command less public acceptance than legislative 
enactments"), 98 (the power to command consent comes "from the continuing force of 
the rule of law-from the belief that the major influence in judicial decisions is not fiat 
but principles which bind the judges as well as the litigants and apply consistently yester-
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proach to law, however. Legal realist sophistication also appears 
in the legal process Forewords.s3 
Nevertheless, the legal process Forewords were also charac-
teristically fascinated with details of the judicial process. These 
Forewords are often deeply interested in the number of opinions 
or the number of writs of certioraris4 or the number of summary 
opinions, especially those disposed of before argument.ss The 
nonpareil of this category is, of course, Henry Hart's 1959 Fore-
word, "The Tune Chart of the Justices." Hart began with as-
sumptions about the length of a Supreme Court term and the 
number of cases· the Court handled and then drew conclusions 
about how much time a Justice could spend on his various tasks. 
The gradations get smaller and smaller in Hart's analysis. He 
concluded, for example, that there were 1,532 hours in each Jus-
tice's working year,s6 and that 116 of these hours would be spent 
on decisions simultaneously granting certiorari and reversing the 
judgement below.s' The primary point Hart was trying to make 
was quintessential legal process jurisprudence: that the court did 
not have the time to handle so many cases if it was to meet stan-
dards of judicial craftsmanship and reasoned elaboration, and 
that the Court should thus stay its hand and be less eager to solve 
the world's problems. 
The Forewords also reflect other commonly noted aspects of 
legal process theory. Several Forewords praise universality and 
generality and deprecate particularity.ss A related concern is the 
day, today, and tomorrow"); Henkin at 64 (if the line drawn "is not rational, the law and 
the legal process become less rational and lose the confidence of those they serve"). 
53. Jaffe at 113 (criticizes "cold conceptualism" or a "retreat to labels"); Braucher at 
120 ("cases cannot be decided without making law, so the decision of cases must affect the 
management of public affairs"); Griswold at 94 ("judges do make law"); Pollak at 67 
("Citation of these isolated examples serves as a reminder of what the whole course of 
American constitutional history regularly confirms: to characterize constitutional limita-
tions as inflexible imperatives is an unproductive form of judicial activity"), 68 (neither of 
these approaches offer much help because there is no meaning to be taken from the 
words establishment or free exercise without an appraisal of public education). 
54. Jaffe at 108; Griswold at 85. 
55. Sacks at 99, 103. 
56. Hart at 92. 
57. Id. at 88. 
58. Jaffe at 113 ("cool, comprehensive. lawyerlike" arguments as compared with 
"opinions ring[ing] with a personal tone of charge and countercharge, of points scored, of 
passion, predilection and horrid prophecy"); Brown at 82 (look to remote matters to 
avoid being swayed by passion or predilections); Hart at 125 (reason is the life of law and 
not just votes), 99 ("be a voice of reason, charged with the creative function of discerning 
afresh and of articulating and developing impersonal and durable principles of constitu-
tional law"); Griswold at 91 ("Intellectual disinterestedness in a judge is a pearl of very 
great price, achieved only by continual care and striving"). 
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separation of law and politics,s9 with the latter deprecated as 
well.60 These characteristics of legal process theory are part of 
the standard account. As we will show, however, the Forewords 
suggest that part of that account needs modification. In the stan-
dard account, legal process theory separated procedure and sub-
stance to incorporate realist sophistication about law and politics 
yet harness the disquieting implications of legal realist skepti-
cism.6t Substantive concerns about what the law ought to be 
were different from concerns about whether the proper institu-
tion was handling an issue; substantive concerns were, under this 
view, the purview of legislatures, not courts.62 
Gary Peller's influential description of the legal process 
movement, "Neutral Principles in the 1950's," offers the most ex-
tensive and explicit description of this attempt to separate pro-
cess and substance concerns. In a section in his article entitled 
"The Central Distinction Between Process and Substance," 
Peller describes legal process philosophy as follows: 
59. Hart at 124 (without time for ample study and reflection, judges are more likely 
to tum to general predilections than a lawyerlike examination of the issues), 124-25 (Jus-
tices' voting records easily pigeonholed by sociologists and political scientists), 124 ("posi-
tions tend to jell before ... intensive study"); Kurland at 145, citing Bickel ("Court's 
product has shown an increasing incidence of the sweeping dogmatic statement"), 169 
("substitution of 'hallowed catchword and formula' in place of reasons"), 170 ("rhetoric 
may be helpful advocacy, emotionally appealing, even entertaining, but without more it 
does not solve problems"). 
60. In addition to the citations in the previous footnote, which explicitly deprecate 
politics, Bickel's Foreword, taken as a whole, achieves the same result: by urging the 
Court to avoid legitimating on principle decisions made by a legislature, he implicitly sets 
up an oppositional structure between legislation, expediency and policy-all negatives-
and judicial activity, prudence, and principles. 
61. Gary Peller, 21 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. at 566-72, 588-90 (cited in note 49). 
62. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition 315 (Oxford U. 
Press, 1976) ("The identification of law as a process and of appellate judging as an intel-
lectual effort to keep the process in smooth working order focused discussion of judicial 
decision-making on reasons rather than on results. Reasons, in fact, subsumed results; 
process subsumed substance"); Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional The-
ory-And Its Future, 42 Oh. St. L. J. 223, 227 (1981) ("[academics like Weschler, Bickel, 
Hart, Griswold, and Gunther] claimed that judicial review is also less 'anomalous' in a 
representative democracy if judges act only on 'process' issues having to do with perfec-
tion of representative democracy itself, avoiding interference in the political resolution of 
more controversial 'substantive' matters"); Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of 
American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 253 (Oxford U. Press, 1992) 
("The Transformation of American Law") ("post-war academic thought sought to repress 
politics by devoting its energies to form instead of substance and to technical accomplish-
ment at the expense of social or political insight"), 255 ("Among the most significant 
contributions [of post-war writings on democratic theory] were efforts to elebarate a pro-
cess-oreinted theory of democracy free of any substantive commitments to particular val-
ues such as equality"). See also G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: 
A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 Sw. L.J. 819, 829 (1986) ("attention to the civil rights 
of minorities had not come through democratic processes, but through the recognition of 
the substantive validity of minority claims"). 
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Wechsler's work should be seen as part of the intellectual pro-
ject undertaken by the first generation of post-War scholars-
including Felix Frankfurter, Henry Hart, Alexander Bickel, 
Lon Fuller, Albert Sacks, and Harry Wellington-who to-
gether constructed the "legal process" approach to law, chang-
ing the focus for critical evaluation from the substance to the 
process of decision making.63 
479 
The legal process scholars believed, Peller argues, that "ultimate 
questions of legal legitimacy depend[ed] on a vision of process 
divorced from substance and thereby protected from the corro-
sion of realist critique. "64 
The Forewords of this era indicate something slightly differ-
ent. Legal process scholars writing legal process Forewords were 
quite aware of substantive justifications for the Court's decisions, 
and, more important, used such substantive rationales in their 
own treatments of the Court's work.6s Albert M. Sacks, whose 
casebook with Henry Hart on The Legal Process was the central 
legal process work, offered strong substantive defenses of Brown 
v. Board of Education: "The outstanding feature of the decision 
lies in the triumph of a principle-a principle which the Court 
must have found to be so fundamental, so insistent that it could 
be neither denied nor compromised. The principle can be easily 
stated: the constitution requires equal treatment, regardless of 
race."66 Sacks also turned the legal process limitation of judicial 
competence and insularity on its head so that it became a positive 
factor leading to the Court's substantively correct decision in this 
case: "The nine members of the Court could only have con-
cluded that these propositions represented deeply held beliefs, 
not only of themselves, but, broadly speaking of the country as a 
whole .... The Court [is] a politically sheltered institution whose 
function is to seek to reflect the sober second thought of the 
63. Peller, 21 U.Mich. J.L. Ref. at 566-67 (cited in note 49). 
64. Id. at 589. 
65. Peller may have avoided this insight, in part, by addressing his comments about 
the Foreword project to only a few of those written in the late fifties and early sixties. Id. 
at 570-71. Morton Horwitz, however, notes that "(o]ne is suprised to learn how late it was 
that legal academics actually sought to defend the Brown decision," citing an article by 
Pollak published in 1959. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law at 340 n.71 
(cited in note 62). Horwitz then notes that "[n]ot until Archibald Cox's Foreword in 1966, 
Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91 
(1966), did a defense of the Warren Court appear in (the Forewords to the Harvard Law 
Review]." Id. at 342 n.137. Horwitz's contention is contradicted by Fairman's 1956 Fore-
word's defense of Brown. Moreover, Sacks's 1954 Foreword also defended Brown. Fur-
ther, Sutherland's 1957 Foreword defended the Warren Court's protection of the civil 
liberties of suspected communists. 
66. Sacks at 96. 
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community."67 Finally, Griswold's 1959 Foreword, which is 
otherwise very legal process in approach, and indeed largely de-
fends Hart's scathing Foreword, also contained a substantive 
component: "there must be occasions when judgment is so nicely 
balanced that it is finally resolved by a sense of ultimate 
values. "68 
These materials indicate that the standard version of legal 
process theory should be modified. Although legal process theo-
rists in fact invoked substantive concerns in defending the Court, 
substance operated as something of an outside force, overriding 
the otherwise controlling legal process concerns. In this way, 
substance did not become part of a theoretically integrated ac-
count of law. Substance mattered, but legal process theorists had 
no reasoned elaboration, so to speak, of its role. And, because 
reasoned elaboration defined the range of acceptable accounts 
for legal process theorists, their inability to offer such an elabora-
tion of the role of substance meant that it would be a perma-
nently marginalized element of their accounts of law. The 
standard account of legal process theory may be misleading to 
the extent that it denies that legal process theorists articulated 
substantive concerns, but it accurately describes the deeper struc-
ture of legal process theory. 
B. SUBSTANTIVE FOREWORDS 
A hegemony begins to crack when its adherents see that 
their theory has become less relevant to the real world or when 
outsiders are bold enough to challenge it by blazing a new trail. 
As William Eskridge and Gary Peller put it, "[a]lthough legal 
process theory in the 1950s had developed in part to avoid 
lawtalk about substantive results, progressive process scholars in 
67. ld. Charles Fairman's 1955 Term Foreword also contains a surprisingly substan-
tive defense of Brown: 
Fundamental law must be intimately concerned with ultimate spiritual values. 
When the Court is called upon to apply the broad constitutional promises of 
liberty and equal protection, it takes account of the moral sentiment of the 
American nation. To set quixotic or visionary standards would be an abuse of 
power; to enforce nothing better than a laggard conscience would stultify the 
historic responsibility of our highest court of justice. 
Fairman at 92. (Fairman may not be located unequivocally within the legal process camp, 
but he is closely enough linked to legal process scholars to raise questions about the char-
acterization of the legal process Forewords. The bulk of his Foreword's defense of the 
Segegration Cases does battle on legal process turf; unlike Black or Chemerinsky, Fair-
man accepted the validity of such critiques in general but simply denied their validity with 
respect to Brown. See, e.g., Fairman at 84-85 (accepting as a valid critique but denying its 
particular applicability in this case of the legal process institutional argument that the 
Supreme Court was acting outside its purview in Brown)). 
68. Griswold at 93. 
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the 1970s, such as Charles Black, Owen Fiss, John Hart Ely, and 
Frank Michelman, found it impossible to remain true to legal 
process' purposivism without keeping one eye on substance."69 
Legal process theory was replaced by substantive approaches to 
constitutional law, in which the "legitimacy of law rests upon its 
normative content and not its procedural pedigree."7o 
A more complete version of the standard account of the rise 
of normative legal theory includes references to the political 
changes occurring in the 1 %0s, to which legal process theory 
seemed insensitive at best.n In addition, adherents of substan-
tive accounts of constitutional law could maintain their connec-
tion to the legal realist tradition by invoking the skeptical strand 
of legal realism, taking that skepticism to rest on normative criti-
cisms of the legal status quo. n 
The first crack in the legal process Foreword era, in McClos-
key's 1962 Foreword, was introduced but quickly patched up. 
McCloskey seemed at first to accept and condone the Warren 
Court: 
[A]n institution of such vitality and of such historic anteced-
ents [as the Supreme Court] will never be entirely cribbed and 
confined by any prescriptions we write for it. When the men 
who hold these lofty commissions see an evil that they believe 
imperatively calls for redress, they will on occasion strike out, 
with little regard for consistency or caution.7J 
But he backtracked within the same paragraph: 
[A] price is paid for each judicial venture into uncharted and 
unchartable seas, whether or not an analogue can be found in 
past or present judicial behavior. Each such venture tarnishes 
a little more the idea that the judicial process and the legisla-
tive process are distinguishable, and this idea, as has been said, 
is indispensable to judicial review.74 
The first major foreshadowing of the shift to come, however, 
appeared in Kurland's 1964 Foreword. Kurland's piece differed 
69. William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Mod· 
eration as a Postmodem Cultural Form, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 707, 724 (1991). 
70. Id. at 746. 
71. See, e.g., Mark Thshnet, Post-Realist Legal Sclwlarship, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 1383. 
Another part of the account is that the policy scientific strands in legal realism were 
picked up most prominently in the legal academy by law-and-economics. 
72. The standard account of the transition from legal process theory to substantive 
theories may arise because its authors may be seeking to define their own efforts by paint-
ing their predecessors as naively or cynically distant from the substance of decisions. 
73. McCloskey at 69-70. 
74. ld. at 70. 
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in several significant ways from the Forewords that preceded it. 
Kurland grappled with the Supreme Court's equal protection 
revolution. Though most of his essay still offered the standard 
legal process critiques, he could not simply apply them if his 
Foreword was to be relevant to the Court's work. 
The most notable difference, however, is that Kurland ex-
plicitly expressed self-doubt about legal process theory: 
The Court will continue to play the role of the omniscient and 
strive toward omnipotence. And the law reviews will continue 
to play the game of evaluating the Court's work in light of the 
fictions of the law, legal reasoning, and legal history rather 
than deal with the realities of politics and statesmanship.75 
In this passage Kurland noted the irrelevancy of legal process 
scholarship about the Supreme Court. Kurland's self-doubt 
stands in stark contrast to Hart's Foreword, which was so confi-
dent about its theory that Hart could claim that the entire Court, 
with all its law clerks, was bested by a difficult case.76 When writ-
ten, Kurland's Foreword might have seemed to have an ironic 
tone, its self-deprecation designed to demonstrate the superiority 
of the legal process approach to the Court's substantive one. In 
retrospect, though, it seems more simply descriptive than ironic, 
an acknowledgement that the terrain on which discussion had to 
occur had changed. 
Perhaps the legal process viewpoint lost its hold, in addition, 
because its adherents found themselves unable to justify Brown 
within the framework of their theory. This failure may have con-
founded the next generation of scholars, themselves political lib-
erals as were the legal process theorists. Such scholars could not 
reconcile the "last great attempt at a grand synthesis of law in all 
its institutional manifestations"'' with their views on the justice 
of that case. This inner struggle appears in Cox's first Foreword, 
in 1966. Within the scope of five pages, Cox moved back and 
forth, criticizing, then praising, then criticizing the Warren Court. 
The first round of criticism is legal process theory, expressing 
concern about the limitations on judicial capacity, public accept-
ance, extraordinary constitutional stresses, and rational adjudica-
tion.'& Then Cox praised the Warren Court: "It is hard to know 
just how much weight to attribute to the want of systematic ra-
tionalization .... There is danger, too, as Lord Radcliffe warns 
75. Kurland at 175. 
76. Hart at 121. 
77. Peller, 21 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 568 (cited in note 49). 
78. Cox at 94-95. 
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us, that the intellectual fascination of the lawyer's art may divert 
us from the human goals of the enterprise. "79 Bound as he was 
to his generation of scholarship, Cox returned to criticism: 
Yet when all this is said, ability to rationalize a constitutional 
judgment in terms of principles referable to accepted sources 
of law is an essential, major element of constitutional adjudi-
cation. It is one of the ultimate sources of the power of the 
Court-including the power to gain acceptance for the occa-
sional great leaps forward which lack such justification.so 
Black's Foreword in the following year came close to an-
nouncing the demise of legal process theory by explicitly re-
jecting its tenets. Black argued that courts are not less 
institutionally qualified than legislatures to deal with constitu-
tional questions.s1 He argued against a passive, cautious judici-
ary when questions arise with respect to confrontations between 
state laws and the federal constitution.s2 He also argued in favor 
of meting out substantive justice instead of worrying about the 
niceties of legal process: "[w]e ought not be deciding which 
branch or organ of government is most nicely suited to dealing 
with th[e] problem [of racism]; we ought to be using every gov-
ernmental power to its fullest extent, straining every resource we 
have to deal with it. "s3 
Black also denied the validity of the legal process exultation 
of universality and generality, with an explicit rebuttal as well as 
through his use of language. Black cited Justice Field's opinion 
in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan: "[w]e cannot shut our eyes to matters 
of public notoriety and general cognizance. When we take our 
seats on the bench we are not struck with blindness, and forbid-
den to know as judges what we see as men. "84 By claiming that 
judges should understand the particularized effects of the admin-
istration of an otherwise neutral law, as was involved in that case, 
Black rejected the view of judges as supposedly neutral observ-
ers. Likewise, Black's language was itself passionate. In a de-
nunciation of racism early in his Foreword, Black wrote, "Strong 
words? I wish they were stronger."ss He continued this thought 
later: "Passion has its dangers; so has lack of passion, and so has 
79. ld. at 97. 
80. Id. at 98. 
81. Black at 103. 
82. ld. at 104. 
83. Id. at 105. 
84. ld. at 71. 
85. ld. at 70. 
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the insidious desire to be thought unimpassioned. I deeply be-
lieve in what I have written."86 
Attacks on legal process positions appear regularly in subse-
quent Forewords. Tigar's 1970 Foreword criticized the small 
world of Supreme Court justices. He provided a particularized 
account of the world in which Supreme Court opinions actually 
operate as a way of deconstructing the professed goals of objec-
tivity and universality. This critique is summed up by Tigar's 
comment that the court's treatment of the criminal process is 
marked by abstraction.s1 Kalven's 1971 Foreword noted that the 
"Court in the recent cases has shown itself comfortable with the 
almost non-judicial nature of the issues and with the special data 
brought to bear on them."ss In 1984, Bell wrote that "only the 
privileged have the option of demanding that ideas be novel, that 
principles be neutral, and that solutions to our problems conform 
to their notions of fairness and equality."s9 Chemerinsky's 1988 
Foreword took the Rehnquist Court to task for what Chemerin-
sky believed was its cynical, unprincipled, and merely political 
application of the rhetoric of legal process theory. 
The Foreword project did more than criticize legal process 
theory. The project replaced that theory with substantive (or 
normative) theories. Michelman's 1969 Foreword, appropriating 
John Rawls's Theory of Justice as a theory of the equal protection 
clause, redefined the project. Under this substantive style of 
Foreword, an author generally offers a theory or model external 
to constitutional doctrine. This model, like Michelman's, is often 
interdisciplinary, incorporating ideas from philosophy, political 
science, or economics. These substantive, non-doctrinal models 
provide the criteria by which the author evaluates the Supreme 
Court's opinions. The cases and doctrine discussed in these Fore-
words typically show no more than that the theory has some de-
scriptive accuracy, if that. The substantive theories appear as 
ends in themselves.90 
Legal process did not, however, disappear.9t Well after 
Michelman's 1969 Foreword, legal process strands continued to 
86. Id. at 109. 
87. ligar at 28. 
88. Kalven at 11. 
89. Bell at 82-83. 
90. The substantive models may also provide a means to measure whether the 
Court's decisions were correct, although even this concern plays a subsidiary role. 
91. One explanation for this phenomenon may be that the Warren Court did not 
really begin in 1954, with Brown v. Board of Education. See Horwitz, The Transforma-
tion of American Law at 252-53 (cited in note 62). Thus, it makes sense that the legal 
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appear.92 Gunther and Monaghan wrote Forewords, in 1972 and 
1975, respectively, that were almost completely legal process in 
outlook. Each of Cox's and Freund's second Forewords fit 
within that tradition, even though they were published after sub-
stantive Forewords were the rule. Ely's Foreword provides the 
most successful integration of process and substantive theories, 
arguing that the substantive concerns that led many to reject 
legal process theory actually can be accommodated in a properly 
formulated process theory: Representation-reinforcing review, 
according to Ely, will yield the desired substantive results, includ-
ing Brown, without requiring a commitment to controversial sub-
stantive theories.93 
Yet, these more recent Forewords share a deep structural 
similarity to the legal process Forewords. Originating from legal 
realism, and attempting to provide a theoretical basis for the 
political defense of the New Deal's legislative programs against a 
reactionary Supreme Court, legal process theory incorporated a 
deep commitment to democratic self-governance, no matter how 
distorted that commitment became in the elitist hands of the au-
thors of some of the 1950s Forewords. In abandoning legal pro-
cess theory for substantive theories, the recent Forewords 
recreate the awkward relation to democratic self-governance that 
the legal process Forewords had to Brown. Their authors are of 
course committed democrats, but they have no theoretical basis 
for explaining why their substantive concerns ought not always 
override contrary conclusions produced by the processes of dem-
ocratic self-governance. So, the commitment to democracy is an 
"add-on" in many recent Forewords, as the commitment to 
Brown was an add-on to the earlier ones.94 
process school would still appear strong in Forewords published several years after 
Brown. 
92. See, e.g., Kalven at 3. 
93. The process or ontology of law is a subject taken up by a number of recent 
Forewords. Process, albeit not doctrinaire legal process, concerns appear in Fiss's and 
Chayes's Forewords, which look at structural reform or public law litigation, and in both 
Calebresi's and Sullivan's Forewords. Forewords considering Jaw's ontology also appear 
in recent Forewords. Cover's 1983 Foreword, "Nomos and Narrative," provides an exam-
ple of this phenomenon. Michelman's second Foreword, which deals with republicanism, 
also fits within this category, as does West's. These recent Forewords do not criticize the 
Court as did the legal process Forewords, but still share an interest in operational aspects 
of the law or legal system. 
94. No recent Foreword author has been so committed a post-modernist as to deny 
the proposition that a theoretically integrated account of Jaw is possible. And, if one were 
to take that position as to his or her own work, we would wonder what basis there would 
be for criticizing the legal process Forewords as awkward pastiches. 
486 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:463 
c. THE FOREWORDS' AUDIENCES 
At the same time the Forewords were undergoing a shift 
from legal process exercises to substantive critiques, their au-
thors' image of their audience appears to have changed as well. 
The change from legal process to substantive Forewords also rep-
resents a change in what Foreword writers talk about and to 
whom they think they are talking. 
The shift in Forewords from legal process to substantive in 
nature involves, first, a decline in the role played by doctrine.9s 
Doctrine in modern, substantive Forewords like Michelman's 
and Cover's served the primary purpose of justifying the substan-
tive model. In contrast, Cox's second Foreword or Freund's 
Foreword, when not expressing legal process concerns, are com-
pletely doctrinal: the doctrine is an end, not simply a means of 
further analysis.96 Of course, this change in the Forewords is part 
of a general shift in legal scholarship.97 
One measure of the shift away from doctrinal analysis in the 
Forewords is the degree to which these articles treat or even cite 
important cases from the preceding term. With the shift to sub-
stantive modelling in the Forewords, authors are less likely to 
mention cases that do not relate to their model.9s Authors now 
95. Since 1985 the Law Review's Supreme Court edition has included a legal 
scholar's case comment on one major decision of the Supreme Court. These comments 
resemble the early Forewords, and perhaps should be considered as their direct descend-
ants, with the articles now called Forewords being collateral descendants. 
96. Obviously there are generational differences at work here. 
97. This Essay itself exemplifies this shift. Judge Posner documented this shift in the 
100th anniversary issue of the Harvard Law Review. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of 
Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 761 (1987). An even 
more striking example of this shift appeared in a recent symposium on the "crisis" in legal 
scholarship. The two scholars given the task of defending traditional doctrinal analysis in 
law reviews both admit that this type of scholarship is their least favorite. Steven D. 
Smith, In Defense of Traditional Legal Scholarship: A Comment on Schlegel, Weisberg, 
and Dan-Cohen, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 627, 627 (1992) ("I will frankly confess at the outset 
that doctrinal analysis isn't something that I especially enjoy doing or reading"); David P. 
Bryden, Scholarship About Scholarship, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 641, 643 (1992) ("This said, 
let me add that my favorite types of scholarship are not directly helpful to practicing 
lawyers"). See also Cramton, 36 J. Legal Ed. at 10 (cited in note 12) ("Law faculty mem-
bers, especially at the better schools, write primarily for other academics who approach 
the same subject matter using the same methods (whether economic, historical, or philo-
sophical)"); Robert Post, Legal Scholarship and the Practice of Law, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 
615, 620 (1992) (noting "the emergence within the past fifteen years of a form of legal 
scholarship that is self-consciously external to the practice of law and that takes its bear-
ings instead from traditional academic pursuits"). 
98. To arrive at some view of what might be considered the most important 
Supreme Court decisions handed down over the time the Forewords have been published, 
from 1951 to 1992, we consulted two sources, one middlebrow (Elder Witt, Guide to the 
U.S. Supreme Court (Congressional Quarterly, 2d ed. 1990)), and one purposefully low 
brow (Robert J. Wagman, The Supreme Court: A Citizen's Guide 123-67 (Pharos Books, 
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view doctrine as a means and, unlike the legal process authors, 
not an end in and of itself. 
The shift away from doctrine was largely foreseen by the 
legal process Foreword authors. Hart was explicitly opposed to a 
substantive style of critique: "Many even of the professional crit-
ics of the Court's work seem to have little more to say, in sub-
1993)). To eliminate randomness in one source's choice of a "most important decision," 
only those cases where the two sources were in agreement were chosen. A comparison 
between these selected cases and the cases taken up in the Forewords of the year in which 
they were decided shows these trends: that legal process Forewords regularly cited or 
discussed the major cases of their period; that the subsequent, substantive Forewords are 
much more likely to ignore the major cases decided in their year, except when the case is 
of extraordinary importance, e.g. Roe v. Wade. Several examples are noteworthy: Black's 
1967 Foreword did not mention Loving v. Virginia; Michelman's 1969 Foreword did not 
mention Benton v. Maryland, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict, or Powell v. McCormack; Tigar's 1970 Foreword did not mention In re Winship or 
Williams v. Florida; and Brest's 1976 Foreword did not mention Gregg v. Georgia, Wood-
son v. Nonh Carolina, or Craig v. Boren. The following list tells which cases were listed 
by both sources and whether they were mentioned in that year's Foreword: Youngstown 
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) (theme of Freund's Foreword); Brown v. Board I 
(1954) (mentioned); Brown v. Board II (1955) (mentioned); Roth v. U.S. (1957) (men-
tioned); Watkins v. U.S. (1957) (mentioned); Cooper v. Aaron (1958) (not mentioned); 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rei Patterson (1958) (not mentioned); Barneblatt v. United States 
(1959) (mentioned); Mapp v. Ohio (1961) (mentioned); Engel v. Vitale (1962) (not men-
tioned); Baker v. Carr (1962) (theme of Foreword); Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) (not 
mentioned); Hean of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964) (not mentioned); New York 
Tunes v. Sullivan (1964) (mentioned); Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) (mentioned); Malloy v. 
Hogan (1964) (mentioned); Reynolds v. Sims (1964) (mentioned); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut (1965) (mentioned); Miranda v. Arizona (1966) (mentioned); South Carolina v. Kat-
zenbach (1965) (mentioned); Loving v. Virginia (1967) (not mentioned); Benton v. 
Maryland (1969) (not mentioned); Tmker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District (1969) (not mentioned); Powell v. McCormack (1969) (not mentioned); In re Win-
ship (1970) (not mentioned); Williams v. Florida (1970) (not mentioned); New York Tunes 
v. United States (1971) (mentioned); Miller v. California (1973) (mentioned); Roe v. Wade 
(1973) (mentioned); Gregg v. Georgia (1976) (not mentioned); Woodson v. North Caro-
lina (1976) (not mentioned); Craig v. Boren (1976) (not mentioned); Coker v. Georgia 
(1977) (not mentioned); University of California v. Bakke (1978) (mentioned); United 
Steelworkers of America v. Weber (1979) (not mentioned); Richmond Newspapers v. Vir-
ginia (1980) (mentioned); Chandler v. Florida (1981) (not mentioned); Board of Educa-
tion, Island Trees Unions Free School District v. Pico (1982) (not mentioned); United 
States v. Leon (1984) (not mentioned); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority (1985) (not mentioned); Tennessee v. Gamer (1984) (not mentioned); Lockhart v. 
McCree (1986) (not mentioned); Ford v. Wainwright (1986) (not mentioned); Bowers v. 
Hardwick (1986) (mentioned); Texas v. Johnson (1989) (mentioned). Of course, several 
caveats should be made. First, the decision to include a case in any list after the fact gives 
that author the twenty-twenty vision of hindsight. Moreover, Foreword authors need not 
discuss every case, for each Harvard Law Review Supreme Court issue contains a student 
note that serves this purpose, and the most recent issues have also included a case com-
ment on a major decision of the preceding term. Indeed, several Foreword authors in-
clude this caveat in their essay. See Kurland at 176 ("This Foreword has not, by any 
means, considered all the work of the Court's 1963 Term"); Kalven at 6 ("The real infor-
mation as to what the Court did during the Term will, as always, be left to the extended 
Note that follows"). Nevertheless, the trend is significant enough to indicate a distance 
from the Court's decisions. 
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stance, than that they do not like some of the results and yearn 
for ipse dixits their way instead of the Court's way."99 
The change in the use of doctrine may be explained largely 
by considering who the Foreword authors are. Judge Posner's 
explanation for the move away from doctrine considers the na-
ture of academic success and interest: 
Another reason, which is purely internal to the enterprise of 
academic law, is the same one that led composers to write ato-
nal music and that led English poets eventually to tire of the 
heroic couplet. When a technique is perfected, the most imag-
inative practitioners get restless. They want to be innovators 
rather than imitators, and this desire requires that they strike 
out in a new direction. . . . Because of this ... in the 1960s a 
new type of legal scholarship began to emerge in the leading 
law schools-the conscious application of other disciplines, 
such as political and moral philosophy and economics, to 
traditional legal problems. . . . Although the classic works of 
traditional legal scholarship can still be read with profit and 
admiration, it is no longer easy for academic lawyers who want 
to be considered on the "cutting edge" of legal thought to im-
agine writing in the same vein.lOO 
The shift away from doctrine may also be explained by 
changes in the Foreword writers' experience. One important 
change is between the pre-teaching experiences of the legal pro-
cess Foreword authors and those of the substantive authors. The 
main difference is experience outside academe. Legal process 
Foreword authors spent an average of about eleven years outside 
academe, primarily practicing law.101 In contrast, substantive 
Foreword writers spent an average of less than four years.toz The 
one obvious significance about this difference is that the longer a 
Foreword writer spent practicing law, the more likely that author 
will be concerned with doctrinal analysis-the staple of profes-
sional lawyers. Martin Shapiro calls the legal process Foreword 
critics of the Warren Court "a generation of academic lawyers for 
99. Hart at 125. 
100. Posner, 100 Harv. L. Rev. at 771-73 (cited in note CJ7). 
101. Jaffe 8, Freund 8, Howe 12, Sacks 4, Braucher 10, Fairman 0, Sutherland 20, 
Brown 15, Hart 2, Griswold 4, Bickel 5, McCloskey 10, Pollak 7, Kurland 6, Mishkin 0, 
Cox 8, Henkin 17, Gunther 3, Monaghan 5. The average cited in the text does not include 
Fairman, who entered teaching as a historian; it also excludes Freund's and Cox's second 
Forewords. 
102. Black 4, Michelman 3, ligar 3, Kalven 7, Tribe 2, Brest 4, Karst 5, Ely 5, Fiss 4, 
Sager 0, Chayes 6, Cover 0, Easterbrook 8, Bell 11, Minow 2, Chemeri~ky 2, West. 4, 
Calebresi 1, Sullivan 3. The average cited in the text does not count M1chelman tWice 
even though he wrote two Forewords. 
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whom the New Deal was a highly personal and often formative 
experience."lo3 Again in contrast, a person whose career has 
been spent in the academy is likely to be more "academic." As 
David Bryden writes, 
Several years ago, I interviewed a Supreme Court clerk who 
was interested in teaching. She had been the president of the 
Harvard Law Review. "When I'm done clerking," she asked, 
"should I practice law for a while before becoming a teacher?" 
I offered the standard advice, saying that a couple of years of 
practice, though not essential, would be helpful. "That's inter-
esting," she replied. "Several of my friends on the Harvard 
faculty advised against it. They thought it would give me a 
taint." That's an extreme case, but there's no doubt that some 
scholars at elite institutions tend to disparage mundane practi-
tioners' problems.104 
The change to substantive Forewords may also be connected 
to the legal academy's shift to the political left. The legal process 
Forewords are now considered profoundly conservative.tos If the 
substantive Foreword authors are indeed more politically liberal 
than their legal process predecessors, their decision to rely on 
substantive models rather than doctrinal analysis makes sense. 
Liberals who view law as an instrumental tool with which to re-
make society may find available doctrinal tools unsatisfactory. 
Or they may find that their take on doctrine is simply not treated 
as within the realm of the possible by the mainstream, conserva-
tive lawyers who tend to become judges. Therefore, such liberals 
posit substantive models (or new fantasy worlds) where their 
political ideology could come into being. Michelman's 1969 
Foreword serves, again, as the best example to support this argu-
ment. Michelman wanted to have the Court recognize certain 
minimum standards in shelter and other goods. With insufficient 
doctrine to support such new rights, Michelman incorporated 
John Rawls's Theory of Justice into his argument, providing an 
end-run around existing doctrine. Fiss and Chayes speak about 
structural reform through public law litigation, because their nor-
mative goals for the world would be hampered by the institu-
tional competence arguments prevalent in the legal process 
Forewords. 
103. Shapiro, Fathers and Sons, in The Burger Coun: The Counter-Revolution that 
Wasn't at 218 (cited in note 48). 
104. Bryden, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 642-43 (cited in note fJ7). 
105. Peller, 21 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. at 566 (cited in note 49). 
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A final shift in personnel which may bear some relation to 
the transformation in the Forewords is the inclusion of outsiders 
within the legal academy and especially within the institution of 
Forewords.106 The small, closed world of the legal process Fore-
words is best exemplified by Hart's stupid joke about virgin girls 
on the first page of his Foreword, which reflects the absence of 
any consciousness that such a joke might be of questionable 
taste. The Forewords have not been oblivious to changes in the 
demography of the legal academy. The three notable "firsts" 
brought a freshness into their Forewords. Minow urged the jus-
tices to apply a particularized analysis of differences by attempt-
ing to look at questions from the viewpoints of others. Bell 
employed fictional narratives to show liberals how what they can-
not imagine might be true is more real than they might like to 
think.l07 
These transformations are reflected as well in the audience 
to whom the Foreword authors think they are talking. The legal 
process Foreword authors truly believed they were in a dialogue 
with the Supreme Court, in addition to other academics and the 
bar. In contrast, more modern, substantive Foreword writers 
speak, at least on the surface, primarily to other scholars. 
Evidence that legal process scholars thought they had the 
Court's ear can be seen in the tone of their pieces. In a striking 
contrast to the substantive Forewords that follow, legal process 
Forewords were either very polite and deferential toward the 
Supreme Court or harshly critical. Jaffe's Foreword, the first in 
this series, offered a seeming apology for his essay by pointing 
out that it is in the nature of the Court's business to produce 
dissatisfaction, for it cannot please everyone: 
[T]he Court is a symbol embodying a congeries of diverse and 
contradictory hopes: to the well-to-do, an ever present fortress 
against the attacks of the have-nots; to the poor and the de-
spised, the hope for equality on earth; to the social reformer, 
an active participant in the reconstruction of society by law; to 
Charles Curtis, the self-elected torch of the best and most for-
ward ideals of our society; and as if these glowing tasks were 
106. For a chart that portrays these differences, see Eskridge and Peller, 89 Mich. L. 
Rev. at 744 (cited in note 69). 
107. ligar, the first "young" Foreword author, who as a radical leader of the Free 
Speech Movement at Berkeley may properly be considered quite different from a typical 
straightlaced law professor in 1970, spoke in the parlance of his day, referring for example 
to a "nickel bag of the dread weed." ligar at 12. ligar also narrated his experiences in 
squalid and depressing courtrooms where justice is an empty concept. 
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not enough, to the lawyer qua professional, the ultimate prac-
titioner of the arts and graces of the law.los 
491 
The second Foreword also feared "the risk of appearing ungrate-
ful for a remarkable display of learning, eloquence, and indepen-
dence of spirit" and noted that "[i)f this discussion has had in it a 
large share of doubts and dissonances, it is not because serene 
harmonies could not also be voiced, but simply because these are 
less absorbing."Hl9 Griswold's Foreword was an apology for the 
harsh critique of the Court that appeared in Hart's previous 
Foreword. Without referring directly to Hart's Foreword, Gris-
wold noted that "many criticisms may be, like their authors, de-
void of good taste,"no and that some criticism of the Court, like 
Georgia's call for the impeachment of certain liberal justices, was 
"irresponsible and extravagant to an unfortunate extreme."tn 
Kurland speaks of the enormity of the task that burdens the 
Court: "Certainly it is easier to criticize the work of the Court 
than to perform it. Even Professor Wechsler did not offer an ad-
equate replacement to the Brown opinion. "uz 
In contrast to the deference shown in these comments, other 
legal process Forewords were especially harsh in their critique. 
The standard legal process concerns were sometimes presented 
in a tone suggesting that the author could not believe that the 
Court was so incompetent. Judge Skelly Wright found that the 
tone of these Forewords involved "almost scurrilous 
disrespect":tn 
[M]ost suggestive of their true orientation, these self-ap-
pointed scholastic mandarins almost always coat this tech-
nique of criticism with a haughty derision of the Court's 
powers of analysis and reasoning-terming the Court, for ex-
ample, an inept piano player who need not necessarily be shot 
but who surely ought to "take piano lessons."114 
The paragon of nastiness was Hart's Foreword. Hart tried to 
modulate the stinging tone of his Foreword by claiming that he 
wrote "[r]egretfully and with deference."11s This attempt was 
overwhelmed by later remarks: 
108. Jaffe at 107. 
109. Freund at 89, 97. 
110. Griswold at 81, quoting Brewer, Government by Injunctions, 15 Nat'l Corp. Rep. 
848, 849 (1898). 
111. ld. at 82. 
112. Kurland at 176. 
113. Wright, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at n8 n.33 (cited in note 13). 
114. Id. at 7n-78. 
115. Hart at 100. 
492 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:463 
Few of the Court's opinions, far too few, genuinely illumine 
the area of law with which they deal. Other opinions fail even 
by much more elementary standards. Issues are ducked which 
in good lawyership and good conscience ought not to be 
ducked. Technical mistakes are made which ought not to be 
made in decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.l16 
Hart continued this pattern throughout his Foreword.111 
Both the deferential and the critical tone reveal that the authors 
thought they were speaking to the Court. They would shout in 
the Court's ear or couch their criticisms in polite, deferential 
sweet-nothings only if they believed the Court was listening.us 
A parallel phenomenon is the degree to which the Fore-
words actually appeared to be seeking influence. The most nota-
ble examples are Sacks's and Fairman's defenses of Brown v. 
Board of Education. Fairman's defense, appearing a year after 
Brown II, took up a case decided two Terms earlier. He did this, 
he made clear, because the public had greeted the segregation 
decisions with outright disobedience. Sutherland's Foreword 
also took the form of an apology, for the Court's decisions pro-
tecting the right of suspected Communist-sympathizers. Noting 
that "the term is over, and heated comments are cooling,"H9 
Sutherland argued in defense of the Court that its decisions re-
ally would not have much effect on the nation's ability to weed 
out Communists. 
One reason the legal process Foreword authors may have 
thought someone was listening was that they had one of their 
own on the Court: Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter was the intel-
lectual progenitor for the early Forewords.12o Moreover, Frank-
furter actually did listen to what the Law Review was saying. His 
papers show a significant amount of correspondence between the 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 108 ("To explicate in short compass all that is wrong with this reasoning is 
not easy"); 110 ("this second interpretation is simply unbelievable ... a transparently 
indefensible reading"; "five Caliphs of Washington"). 
118. The deferential writers of the 1950s may have been respectful and polite because 
of their respect for the institution of the Supreme Court. They were patriotic idealists 
who believed in the goodness of the United States and the Supreme Court. Or, they may 
have understood that even people in important public positions can have their feelings 
hurt by criticism of their public work. Even if this accounts for the deferential authors, it 
cannot account for the more stinging critiques offered by Hart and others. Indeed, the 
difference between these authors and substantive authors is that the latter group usually 
does not bother to critique the Court in such harsh terms or offer a deferential preface 
before any criticism. 
119. Sutherland at 92. 
120. See text accompanying notes 3-7 supra. 
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Justice and staff members of the Review. Frankfurter recom-
mended authors the Review should publish, and gave advice 
about how to cite early cases. Frankfurter was of course a former 
Harvard Law professor, and he took his law clerks on the basis of 
advice from his friend and former coauthor, Henry Hart.t2t In-
deed, in a letter to the then President of the Review, Richard 
Posner, Justice Frankfurter discussed his longstanding affection 
and respect for the Law Review: "[It] occupies a special place 
not only in my memory of my very happy active years as a stu-
dent editor and my association with the successive Boards during 
my teaching years at Cambridge, but as a significant part of our 
legal system down to this day."122 Frankfurter's departure from 
the Court in 1962 came at the same time that the first crack in the 
legal process Foreword occurred. By 1968 the separation of the 
Forewords from the Court was evident. In that year Henkin ex-
plicitly noted the distance between the Court and his Foreword: 
"[e]ven in a day when the law reviews are much cited but not 
often heeded, it may still serve a purpose to hold up to the Court 
a mirror that emphasizes its warts."t23 
The shift in dialogue is, like many of the other shifts in the 
transformation, exemplified by Michelman. Like the other sub-
stantive Foreword authors, and unlike the legal process Foreword 
authors, Michelman did not bother with extended critiques or 
long, deferential passages prefacing his model. Instead, 
Michelman offers a substantive model which serves as an end in 
itself. This model is relevant only to other scholars, not to 
judges.J24 This need not be the case. But the judges and justices 
that are now in the U.S. judicial system, and those one could rea-
sonably expect to enter the judicial system within the near future, 
are unlikely to rely explicitly on John Rawls's Theory of Justice in 
their opinions.125 
121. Although Frankfurter was the first Justice to hire a black as a law clerk, he also 
declined Hart's recommendation that he hire Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 
122. Letter to Richard Posner, 30 June 1961, cited in Richard A. Cosgrove, Our Lady 
the Common Law: An Anglo·American Legal Community, I870-I930 225 (New York U. 
Press, 1987). We thank Dan Ernst for bringing this to our attention. 
123. Henkin at 63. 
124. Meir Dan-Cohen, Listeners and Eavesdroppers: Substantive Legal Theory and Its 
Audience, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 569, 573 ("That judges, or any other public deci-
sionmakers, should become practitioners of substantive legal theory is neither particularly 
likely nor clearly desirable"). 
125. For a general discussion, see William W. Fisher III, The Development of Modem 
American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in Michael J. 
Lacey and Knud Haakonssen, eds., A Culture of Rights: The Bill of Rights in Philosophy, 
Politics, and Law-I79I and I99I 266, 329-34, 342-48, 358-65 (Cambridge U. Press, 
1991). The papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall contain only a few explicit references in 
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Despite the apparent lack of direct connection between the 
recent Forewords and the Supreme Court's work, the shift in the 
project may nonetheless shed light on the Court's history. 
Michelman's Foreword in 1969 defines a relatively sharp break. 
Before 1969 no author had received his law degree after the ap-
pointment of Earl Warren. After 1969, only six authors had re-
ceived their law degrees before Warren's appointment.J26 Four 
of the six authors since 1987 received their law degrees after the 
appointment of Warren Burger,121 though of course none did af-
ter the retirement of William Brennan. 
These numbers bear on the relation between the Forewords 
and the periodization of the history of the Supreme Court. At 
present there are several contenders for periodization since 1937. 
One possibility links political inclinations and judicial activism or 
restraint: The New Deal Court from 1937 to the mid-1950s was a 
politically liberal Court committed to judicial restraint; the War-
ren Court was a politically liberal Court committed to judicial 
activism; the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have been politically 
conservative Courts committed on the level of theory to judicial 
restraint and on the level of practice to a surprising amount of 
judicial activism. A second possibility makes political inclination 
dispositive: a liberal Court from 1937 through Warren's tenure, a 
conservative one thereafter. A final possibility treats the period 
from 1937 as an undivided era, during which the Supreme Court 
has been a partner in the construction and maintenance of the 
peculiar United States version of the welfare state.128 
The agenda of the New Deal Court had two elements. The 
primary one was the result of what Robert Jackson called "the 
struggle against judicial excess."l29 Its catch phrase was "judicial 
restraint versus judicial activism," and, in this element, the New 
correspondence between the Justices to scholarly articles. Justice John Paul Stevens sug· 
gested to Justice Harry Blaclcmun that he include a citation to Cass R.Sunstein, LAw and 
Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071 (1990), in his dissenting opinion in 
Rust v. Sullivan, 491 U.S. 1002 (1991) (Blackmun to Stevens, Feb. 28, 1991, referring to 
Stevens letter of same date, Box 530, file 10). Justice Antonio Scalia insisted that Justice 
Marshall remove a citation to that same article as a condition for his joining Marshall's 
opinion in Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1992), which Marshall did, thereby con-
verting a dissenting opinion to an opinion for the Court (Scalia to Marshall, May 13, 1991, 
Box 538, file 6). 
126. Kalven, Gunther, Freund, Karst, Cox, and Chayes. 
127. Minow, Chemerinslcy, West, and Sullivan. 
128. The Foreword of 1969 is significant if we choose either of the first two periodiza-
tions, because it confirms the phenomenon of lag: it shows that it is (at least) fifteen years 
into a period before authors whose legal consciousness was formed under a particular 
Court are in a position to write Forewords. 
129. Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy: A Study of a Crisis in 
American Power Politics vii (Alfred A. Knopf, 1941). 
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Deal Court and its acolytes were uncomfortable with the exercise 
of the power of judicial review. The secondary element, which 
grew increasingly important, was attention to the constituencies 
identified in footnote four of Carolene Products. Some aggres-
sive judicial action on behalf of the politically powerless might be 
justified, though always uneasily. Even where judicial review 
was accepted, the questions about its appropriate exercise were 
framed in institutional terms: What reasons were there for be-
lieving that judicial action was preferable to legislative action in 
the area under consideration? In the next period the issue of 
judicial restraint versus judicial activism became less and less in-
teresting, as the nation and constitutional scholars became com-
fortable with the exercises of judicial authority exemplified, for 
that generation, by Brown v. Board of Education. Questions of 
relative institutional competence were gradually replaced by 
purely substantive questions: Did the Supreme Court "get it 
right" in invalidating or refusing to invalidate some statute? 
As we have argued, the Forewords trace this rhythm. 
Through 1962 they were concerned almost exclusively with ques-
tions of institutional competence, dealing with the relative abili-
ties of courts and legislatures and the degree to which the Court's 
actions comported with what were taken to be the necessary 
characteristics of judicial as distinct from legislative action. From 
1963 to 1975 the Forewords tended to give primary attention to 
the substantive correctness of the Court's decisions, though insti-
tutional questions never disappeared either as a primary theme 
in the Forewords (for example, in Monaghan's of 1975) or as a 
secondary theme in Forewords devoted primarily to questions of 
substantive correctness. Since 1976 most Forewords devote 
themselves to identifying the proper substantive position that 
they contend the Court should adopt, without noticing that a 
prior generation might have thought that there were some inter-
esting institutional questions that might be addressed. Indeed, in 
the most recent Forewords the questions of institutional compe-
tence have become entirely invisible, the authors concerning 
themselves solely with questions of substantive justice.no 
This last point suggests that perhaps the "single Court" peri-
odization is the appropriate one. Otherwise, we might have ex-
pected that Forewords written fifteen years after the creation of 
130. Even Epstein's Foreword is almost completely substantive, primarily because of 
the author's hostility to any action by the government aside from the enforcement of 
~mmon Jaw rights; for him, what the prior generation would have called judicial activism 
1s the second best solution to the problem of government activity. 
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the Burger Court would have set a different agenda from Fore-
words written under the influence of the Warren Court. They do 
not. Indeed, the most recent Forewords are, if anything, even 
more vigorous than earlier ones in their assertion that the only 
interesting questions are substantive and that the present Court 
has deviated from the path properly set by its predecessor in the 
direction of substantive justice. To that extent, then, we can find 
in the Forewords support for the proposition that the present 
Court is an extension of the Warren Court, in the sense that it 
takes the job of the Supreme Court to be arriving at the right 
answers to normative questions about social life, though of 
course it offers different answers than the Warren Court had. 
And, in this light, the Warren Court might best be seen as an 
extension of the New Deal Court, being an activist Court as part 
of the kind of activist government the United States has had 
since 1937. 
CONCLUSION 
The shift from process to substance, then, may be less signifi-
cant than previous scholarship has suggested. The sense that 
there is such a difference may be the residue of the battles of the 
1920s and 1930s, in which the legal realists prevailed without 
qualification. Legal realism turned out to be the legal theory of 
the United States welfare state. For a while, during the reign of 
legal process theory, it might have seemed that the dragons slain 
by the New Deal might rise again, and legal process theories had 
some bite. It turned out that we continue to live in the welfare 
state, and no one-not even conservatives-has developed an al-
ternative legal theory that has even modest persuasive power. 
With the welfare state permanently entrenched (in its distinctive 
United States form), scholars who discuss the Supreme Court are 
likely to find that the only vocabulary they have is provided by 
the language of ordinary politics. That, we suggest, accounts 
more than anything else for the transformation of the Forewords' 
project. 
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